Affirming An Illegitimate Statute by Byrd, Ron
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 9
Number 2 Spring 1979 Article 7
1979
Affirming An Illegitimate Statute
Ron Byrd
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation





On December 11, 1978, the Supreme Court in a 5-4
decision, upheld the constitutionality of a statute allow-
ing an illegitimate child to inherit from his intestate father
only if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the
father's lifetime, entered an order declaring paternity. In
Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978) the Court stated that the
proof requirement imposed by the New York statute on
illegitimate children who would inherit from their father,
was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th amendment.
The facts of the case are relatively simple, Robert Lalli,
claiming to be the illegitimate son of the decedent, filed a
petition in Surrogate Court for a compulsory accounting
from the administratrix of the estate claiming that he and
his sister (Maureen Lalli) were entitled to inherit from the
elder Lalli, as his children. Evidence substantiating the
claim included affidavits from persons who stated that
Mario Lalli had openly acknowledged that Maureen and
Robert were his children. The administratrix, in oppos-
ing the claim, argued that regardless of the veracity of the
blood relationship, the petitioners were not lawful dis-
tributees of the estate because they had failed to comply
with §4-1.2 of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts
Law which in part states:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his
father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if
a court of competent jurisdiction has during the life-
time of the father, made an order of filiation declaring
paternity in a proceeding instituted during the preg-
nancy of the mother or within two years from the birth
of the child.t
Petitioners' argument that §4-1.2 was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause was not persuasive to
the Surrogate Court. Noting that recent New York deci-
sions had affirmed the constitutionality of the statute,2
the court ruled that the petitioners were properly ex-
cluded "as [distributees] of Lalli's estate and therefore
lacked status to petition for a compulsory accounting,"
99 S.Ct. 518, 522 (1978). On direct appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed, In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 378
N.Y.S.2d 351, 340 N.E.2d 721 (1975). On remand from
the Supreme Court, Lalli v. Lalli, 431 U.S. 911 (1977), the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed its previous deci-
sion, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761, 371 N.E.2d 481
(1977). Lalli again brought his case before the Supreme
Court, seeking review, 435 U.S. 921 (1978).
1 New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law §4-1.2(a) (2) (1966).
2 E.g., In re Belton, 70 Misc.2d 814, 335 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sur. Ct. 1972);
In re Hendrix, 68 Misc.2d 439, 444,326 N.Y.S.2d 646, 652 (Sur. Ct.
1971).
Mr. Justice Powell announced the principal opinion of
the Court and was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Burger
and Mr. Justice Stewart. Justice Powell noted at the
outset that while "classifications based on illegitimacy
are not subject to strict scrutiny, they nevertheless are
invalid under the 14th amendment if they are not sub-
stantially related to permissible state interests." 99 S.Ct.
at 523.
The Court readily accepted the contention that the
just and orderly disposition of property at death was an
area of activity in which the state had a justifiable and le-
gitimate interest. The issue thus centered upon whether
§4-1.2 of the New York's Estates, Powers and Trust Law
bore a substantial relation to the promotion of accuracy
and efficiency in estate distribution. Justice Powell, in
confronting the question, looked to the problems and
recommendations proffered by the Bennet Commis-
sion,3 a state commission investigating the descent and
distribution of property under New York law. Their find-
ings listed two major problems with regard to illegitimate
heirs: (1) How to reduce the number of fraudulent claims
of heirship and harassing litigation by those claiming to
be illegitimate offspring and (2) How to achieve any final-
ity of decree when there always exists a possibility that a
secret illegitimate heir will appear claiming lack of due no-
tice in the estate distribution. 99 S.Ct. at 526.
The Court's opinion vigorously articulated that §4-1.2
would help alleviate the problems set forth by the com-
mission. "Fraudulent assertions of paternity," Justice
Powell noted, "will be much less likely to succeed, or
even to arise, where the proof is put before a court of law
at a time when the putative father is available to re-
spond.. ." 99 S.Ct. at 526. Secondly, "the administration
of an estate will be facilitated and the possibility of delay
and uncertainty minimized, where the entitlement of an
illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of
judicial record before the administration commences."
Id.
In opposing the statute, appellant cited a recent case
wherein the Supreme Court had struck down an Illinois
statute precluding illegitimate heirs from inheriting
unless the father "acknowledged" the child and the par-
ents intermarried. Trimble u. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977). In Trimble, the Court stated that the statute was
too broad to satisfy equal protection requirements be-
cause it excluded significant categories of illegitimate
children who could be allowed to inherit without jeopar-
dizing the orderly settlement of estates. Trimble, supra,
at 771. Accordingly, petitioner in Lalli argued that the
New York statute also excluded a broad category of il-
legitimate children who can demonstrate convincing
proof of paternity despite lack of court adjudication. Jus-
3 Officially labeled the Temporary State Commission on the
Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates.
1961 N.Y. Laws, ch. 731 §1.
FORUM
tice Powell distinguished Trimble and Lalli by declaring
that whereas the statute in the former case involved the
burdensome requirement of marriage, thus making the
reach of the Illinois law "far in excess of its justifiable pur-
poses," (99 S.Ct. at 527), the latter statute involved
simply an evidentiary requirement. In admitting that
some illegitimate children would be hurt by the statute,
the Court remarked that "few statutory classifications
are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes
produce inequitable results." 99 S.Ct. at 526.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
requiring that a judicial decree be issued during the life-
time of the father before an illegitimate child can assert a
claim against his intestate father's estate. In sum, §4-1.2
is substantially related to the primary state interests
involved. While Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment, Justice
Blackmun's opinion advocated the overruling of
Trimble.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice White,
Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens joined, filed
a dissenting opinion. Practically speaking, Justice Bren-
nan argued, illegitimate children who are presently ac-
knowledged and supported by their fathers are not likely
to bring suit against them for the required judicial filiation
order. Illegitimate children will refrain from such adver-
sary proceedings for fear of "provoking disharmony by
suing their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers of
such illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings
against the father." 99 S.Ct. at 530. Lastly, "fathers who
do not even bother to make out wills. . .are unlikely to
take the time to bring formal filiation proceedings." Id.
Concomitantly, Justice Brennan noted that there were
less drastic means available for assuring accurate and
efficient distribution of intestate property without elimi-
nating many deserving claims to heirship such as publica-
tion notice or a short statute of limitation within which
claims could be filed. Id.
The Court did not rule on that part of §4-1.2 requiring
the paternity proceeding to be brought "during the preg-
nancy of the mother or within two years of the birth of the
child." 4 It remains to be seen whether that part of the sta-
tute can muster 14th amendment approval.
See note I supra. Maryland law regarding illegitimate children in-
heriting from their fathers is as follows:
A child born to parents who have not participated in a mar-
riage ceremony with each other shall be considered to be the
child of his father only if the father (1) Has been judicially deter-
mined to be the father in an action brought under the statutes
relating to paternity proceedings; or (2) Has acknowledged him-
self, in writing, to be the father, or (3) Has openly and notor-
iously recognized the child to be his child; or (4) Has
subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged, orally




Although the Supreme Court had applied the Fourth
Amendment to state administrative searchesi involving
municipal fire, health and housing inspection programs,
the Court's position as to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to federal administrative codes and proce-
dures was unclear. The Supreme Court settled that
question in Marshall u. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978).
In Marshall, an inspector from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration attempted to inspect
an electrical and plumbing installation business without a
search warrant pursuant to federal statute.2 The owner
refused to permit any search of the warehouse without a
warrant. The inspector was limited to the public area of
the premises. An injunction was obtained against the
search, and the Secretary of Labor appealed.
On appeal, the Surpreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, ap-
plied Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and held
that the Fourth Amendment mandated a warrant for
OSHA inspections. Justice White, speaking for the
majority, began by stating that the "Warrant clause of
the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings
as well as private homes." 436 U.S. at 311. After reaf-
firming the holdings in Camara and See, Justice White
turned to the government's position that an exception
from the search warrant requirement had been recog-
nized for "pervasively regulated business[es]," United
States u. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), and for
"closely regulated" industries "long subject to close
supervision and inspection." Colannade Catering Corp.
u. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 (1970). The majority
quickly distinguished these cases due to the types of
industry involved (firearms and liquor, respectively). The
Court stated that when an "entrepreneur embarks upon
such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject
himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.. .The
clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is
the exception." 436 U.S. at 313. Nor did the mere fact
that businesses in interstate commerce are closely regu-
Camara u. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
2 The statute authorized the Secretary of Labor to empower agents
to enter and at reasonable times any "environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer"; it further permitted
the agent to "inspect and investigate during regular working hours
and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in
a reasonable manner. .. all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials.. and to
question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or
employee." 29 U.S.C. §657 (a) (1970).
